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Abstract Human perception and action are tailored to the
situation at hand, and thus reflect the current intentions of
the perceiver/actor. We suggest that this is achieved by an
‘‘intentional-weighting’’ mechanism. It operates on the
cognitive representations of the features of perceived
events and produced event—perceptions and actions that
is. Intention- or goal-related feature dimensions are
weighted more strongly, so that feature values defined on
the respective dimension have a stronger impact on infor-
mation processing, and stimulus and response selection in
particular. This article discusses what intentional weighting
is, how such a mechanism may work, and how it relates to
available research on attention, action planning, and
executive control.
Cognitive control
In everyday life all kinds of behavior are performed
seemingly seamlessly. We are able to plan and execute an
enormous variety of actions, such as visiting a friend for
having a cup of coffee. This involves arranging transpor-
tation to get to your friend’s place, paying attention to
traffic on your way over, controlling your motor system to
move the cup of coffee to your mouth, and so on. We
constantly need to adjust our intended actions to the situ-
ation at hand. That is, in our intended action to go over to
our friend’s house we need to take into consideration the
constantly changing traffic situation in order not to get into
an accident. In our intended action to drink coffee we need
to adjust our arm and hand position in such a way that
enables us to grasp the cup and bring it to our mouth. This
flexibility to adjust to the situational context requires some
kind of cognitive-control mechanism.
Cognitive control pertains to input as well as to output.
That is, we need a control mechanism to select those per-
ceptual events that are important to us and we need a
control mechanism to select the actions we want to per-
form. Since Donders’ (1869) seminal studies, cognitive
control is commonly considered to operate online by
intervening between stimulus-driven processes and the
production of actions (Monsell & Driver, 2000; Norman &
Shallice, 1986; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin &
Schneider, 1977). Accordingly, researchers assume that
attentional mechanisms take care of the available stimulus
information by prioritizing relevant over irrelevant stimuli
were stimulus features, whereas response-selection mech-
anisms make sure that the most appropriate action is being
selected. However, as elaborated elsewhere (Hommel,
2002, 2009), online control mechanisms often operate
automatically in the sense that the outcome of their oper-
ation can be predicted on the basis of the stimulus being
presented in the instructions given to the subject. This
means that the true control operations—the processes
responsible for cognitive adaptations and flexibility—take
place before the first stimulus is being presented and the
first response being selected. In other words, the control of
input and output control must rely on off-line operations
and it is these operations the present article is dealing with.
As we will argue, preparing for a task is associated with
specific processes that are configuring the cognitive system
and the available representations of stimuli and responses
in such a way that online control operations can run off
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more or less automatically. Before we go into the specifics
of how this preparation may work, let us consider the
cognitive representations the respective processes operate
on: the representations of perceptual and action events.
The Theory of Event Coding
Perceptual and action events are somehow represented in
our cognitive system—the sounds we hear, objects we see,
and actions we perform. Neuroscientific findings suggest
that events are represented in a distributed fashion, as
activations in dedicated feature maps spread throughout the
cortex (e.g., DeYoe & Van Essen, 1988; Wickens, Hyland,
& Anson, 1994). Accordingly, the representation of an
event—whether it is perceived or actively produced—can
be considered a network of distributed codes that represent
the features of the event. How these distributed codes
might be operated on to generate perception and action is
being discussed by the Theory of Event Coding (TEC)
suggested by Hommel, Mu¨sseler, Aschersleben, and Prinz
(2001a, 2001b).
TEC is a general framework explaining how perceived
and produced events (i.e., stimuli and actions) are cogni-
tively represented and how their representations interact to
generate perception and action. TEC claims that perception
and action features are coded in a common format and
assumes that perception, attention, intention, and action
share and operate on a common representational domain
(Prinz, 1990). This notion implies that perceiving an object
and acting upon that object is essentially the same process
and involves the same network of represented features.
Accordingly, perception may influence action, and vice
versa—as indeed demonstrated in numerous studies (e.g.,
Craighero, Fadiga, Rizzolatti, & Umilta`, 1999; Hamilton,
Wolpert, & Frith, 2004; Knoblich & Flach, 2001; Proffitt,
2006; Schubo¨, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001).
The theoretical move that allows TEC to relate percep-
tion to action, and vice versa, is grounded in the ideomotor
assumption that actions are cognitively represented in terms
of codes of their perceptual effects (for recent reviews, see
Hommel, 2009; Shin, Proctor, & Capaldi, 2010). In a nut-
shell, the idea is that agents are continuously registering the
perceptual consequences of their movements and integrat-
ing the representations of these consequences with the
motor patterns that brought them about (Lotze, 1852;
James, 1890). If so, action-effect representations become
effective retrieval cues of the actions that are likely to
produce the represented effects, which provides the
knowledge base necessary to anticipate and actively pro-
duce action effects—that is, voluntary action control.
According to TEC, voluntary action is thus more than
producing motor outflow, as it entails the active
anticipation of a wanted perceptual outcome (the action
goal), the actual production of that outcome, and the
repeated integration of that outcome with the action pro-
ducing it. By the same token, TEC has a very active con-
cept of perception, as it considers perceptual input as a
consequence of actively seeking and producing this input.
Indeed, we are unable to perceive a visual object without
having oriented our body and moved our eyes toward this
object, unable to sense its surface without systematically
touching it, and so forth. Hence, both perception and action
are sensorimotor processes that need to integrate sensory
information with the movements responsible for bringing
them about. The only difference between what researchers
call perception and what they call action control is that
analyzing the former focuses on the processing of the
actually produced sensory information, while analyzing
the latter focuses on the selection of motor output based on
the anticipation of this sensory consequences.
The intentional-weighting mechanism
Considering that both perceived events and actively pro-
duced events are cognitively represented in terms of their
sensory features raises the possibility that the processing of
these events is controlled in similar ways and perhaps even
by the same mechanisms. Indeed, Hommel et al. (2001a)
have speculated that the representations of both types of
events may be mediated and contextualized through an
‘‘intentional-weighting’’ mechanism. Before we present a
generalized version of this weighting mechanism, let us
consider two concrete examples to explain the basic logic
underlying it.
First, consider a simple action, such as grasping a bottle
of water. The successful planning of such an action
requires quite a bit of knowledge about grasping in general
and grasping water or other bottles in particular. According
to the ideomotor principle, the agent selects the grasping
action by representing the intended action effect, for
instance by imagining holding the bottle in his or her
dominant hand. However, in an experienced agent, the
motor pattern producing a grasp is likely to be associated
not only with representations of grasped water bottles but
also with representations of all sorts of other objects that
have been and can be grasped: toys, fruits, tools, and so on.
At the same token, the representation of the grasped water
bottle is likely to be associated not only with grasping
actions but also with other action that could result in
holding a water bottle, such as catching. Hence, having
acquired and being able to recall and reactivate particular
action-effect associations is insufficient to tailor the cog-
nitive representations to the task at hand. What is needed is
a mechanism that restricts the possible action opportunities
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to grasping and the possible action outcomes to water
bottles, thereby selecting the task-relevant action and
action-effect representation. How can that be achieved?
The central claim that we want to defend in the fol-
lowing is that such selections are the consequence of
changing the weights of features that are coded on task-
relevant dimensions: intentional weighting. When prepar-
ing for a task, so we suggest, retrieving or forming an
intention automatically increases the weight of features
coded on those dimensions that have been experienced, or
are assumed to be, and/or actually are necessary for coding
task-relevant stimuli and responses. This assumption is
common to models of visual search, where preparing for a
task is suspected to involve the priming of task-relevant
feature dimensions, such as color or shape or any other
target-defining feature (e.g., Wolfe, 1994), or even higher-
order perceptual or semantic features (e.g., Barsalou, 1999;
Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Raaijmakers, 1998). Priming a
feature dimension is assumed to increase the impact of
features being coded on it on object selection and perfor-
mance. As the entire dimension receives more weight, all
features defined on it will be more salient. Note that the
same logic can be applied to action selection. If partici-
pants are asked to discriminate between left and right
keypresses or between approach and avoidance movements
of a joystick, say, this necessarily renders the perceptual
dimensions that are coding for the discriminative action
feature relevant: horizontal location and the forward–
backward (i.e., depth) dimension, respectively. Indeed,
according to the ideomotor principle, action selection
considers the actions’ perceptual consequences, which
suggests that it relies on the perceptual dimensions on
which the task-relevant consequences are defined. This
suggests that preparing for executing the same motor pat-
tern can imply the intentional weighting of very different
perceptual dimensions, depending on which of the per-
ceptual consequences of the pattern are actually intended.
To summarize, we claim that preparing for the percep-
tion and the production of an event includes the automatic
priming of task-relevant feature dimensions (and/or
increasing the output gain of feature values coded on these
dimensions), which increases the impact of codes repre-
sented on this dimension on information processing. Fea-
tures that are task-relevant thus receive more weight than
irrelevant features, which increases the probability that
those features dominate the cognitive representation of the
whole event. The very same perceptual event and motor
pattern may thus be cognitively coded in very different
ways. Intentional weighting is assumed to occur in, and
affect perception as well as action. The weighting of fea-
tures in perception may be called ‘‘attentional’’ weighting
since it affects the way attentional processes operate.
Nevertheless, we claim that the weighting processes are not
any different from the weighting processes that are
affecting action selection, which is why we summarize and
relate both types of weighting by referring to ‘‘intentional
weighting’’—so to indicate that the weighting processes
are a direct consequence of the current intention to per-
ceive and to act. We assume that the off-line, preparatory
intentional weighting serves to control and enable online
control processes, such as attentional selection or action
selection, which then can be carried out more or less
automatically. In other words, we assume that off-line
control can automatize online control (Hommel, 2002,
2007, 2009). As we will emphasize below, the assumed
off-line nature of intentional weighting implies that it is a
slow and time-demanding process that creates control
configurations that are inert and thus take time to modify or
deactivate. In the following, we will review various studies
from different fields of research that shed more light on the
intentional-weighting mechanism and that provide evi-
dence for the claim that intentional weighting is a general
principle underlying cognitive control or, perhaps better,
cognitive meta-control.
Intentional weighting in perceptual search
Strong evidence for the operation of a weighting mecha-
nism is provided by observations in visual search tasks. In
visual search tasks participants are to detect a target item
among non-target items (the distractors) that do or do not
share features with the target. We can distinguish between
feature search tasks and conjunction search tasks. In feature
search tasks, the target that needs to be detected has a
unique feature that none of the distractors have, such as a
different color or shape than the other items. This unique
feature results in the target to pop out. In conjunction
search, the target is not defined by a single unique visual
feature but by a combination of two or more features,
therefore the information of several features must be inte-
grated to locate the target.
According to the feature integration theory by Treisman
(1999) and Treisman and Gelade (1980), basic features are
represented in feature maps. Treisman distinguishes two
kinds of visual search tasks, feature search and conjunction
search. Feature search can be performed fast and pre-
attentively for targets defined by primitive features. Con-
junction search is the serial search for targets defined by a
conjunction of basic features. It is much slower and
requires attention. According to Treisman visual attention
is needed to bind basic features together so that the con-
junction of features (a target that has a unique combination
of features which by themselves are not unique) can be
computed, or objects can be recognized. As this process is
assumed to be serial it is therefore a much slower process
Psychological Research (2013) 77:249–259 251
123
than feature search. Wolfe (1994) and Wolfe, Cave, and
Franzel (1989) extended the feature integration model of
Treisman into what is known as the Guided Search model.
In this model basic features are processed in parallel. The
initial processing of features produces output maps that
integrate bottom-up saliency (local differences between
feature values) and top-down expectations, with attention
being drawn to locations with particularly high levels of
activation.
Targets that are not sharing any features with the non-
targets are called singletons, which are known to ‘pop out’
and, thus, easy to detect. In contrast to claims that singleton
pop out is entirely stimulus driven (Theeuwes, Reimann, &
Mortier, 2006), a number of findings suggest contributions
from a top-down mechanism that operates by weighting
task-related feature dimensions more strongly (Found &
Mu¨ller, 1996; Mu¨ller, Heller, & Ziegler, 1995). In their
1996 studies Found and Mu¨ller (1996) observed that
repeating the target-defining dimension in a pop-out search
task produces a repetition benefit. Interestingly, there was
little or no benefit when repeating the target-defining fea-
tures compared to changing the features within a dimension.
Thus, the benefit was primarily due to dimension-specific
repetition, indicating a passive stimulus-driven dimension
weighting system that merely tracks the defining dimension
and assigns weight to the target-defining dimension (Found
& Mu¨ller, 1996).
Mu¨ller, Reimann, and Krummenacher (2003) investi-
gated whether weightings in visual search can be modified
intentionally. They had participants search for pop-out
targets. Prior to the pop-out detection search task, the
subjects were cued the likely dimension of the upcoming
target, being either color or orientation. This dimensional
cuing facilitated their response. In an additional experiment
the likelihood of the upcoming feature was cued, such as a
specific color. In the latter experiment no facilitating effect
was found. However when a particular feature was cued,
there was a dimension-specific cuing effect. When no cue
was given or neutral cues were presented, then the system
tuned into the dimension defining the target on that trial.
On subsequent trials, there was a slight benefit for the
dimension the system was tuned into on trial N-1, showing
that dimensional cueing spills over to the next trial. These
experiments show that cuing a whole dimension (such as
color) modulates visual search whereas cuing specific
features (such as the color red) does not have that effect,
again showing the dimension-specific nature of the
weighting mechanism. Their findings indicate that even
early visual processes can be modulated in a top-down
fashion, by intentional knowledge-based processes that
facilitate target detection. The cueing process assigns more
weight to the cued dimension, therefore facilitating detec-
tion of features defined on that dimension. In this
dimension-weighting account, it is argued that weight is
allocated to the various dimensions and that an attended
dimension (e.g. the dimension color or the dimension
shape) temporarily receives more weight and hence facil-
itates the pop out of a singleton defined on the attended
dimension. Furthermore, the spillover effects indicate that
dimensional weighting is a slow or sticky process, or needs
to be overruled by a new cue, hence more weight being put
on another dimension.
The observations of Mu¨ller et al. (2003) show that
dimension weighting plays a role in visual attention: Cuing
a feature dimension apparently increases the saliency of
stimuli coded on this dimension, and this improves per-
formance even if this dimension does not need to be
reported. This fits with our assumption that intentional
weighting operates on all feature dimensions that are
involved in discriminating between task-relevant and task-
irrelevant stimuli and/or responses. The intentional-
weighting mechanism for visual search is sketched in
Fig. 1, where the weighting of different dimensions is
influenced by bottom-up as well as top-down factors.
Although this example scenario refers to the detection of
simple features, Weidner and Mu¨ller (2009) have recently
shown that and how dimensional-weighting logic can be
extended to conjunction search.
Visual search tasks are commonly assumed to tap into
stimulus-selection processes only. However, more recent
observations suggest that stimulus- and response-selection
processes interact—just as the TEC would suggest. For
instance, Bekkering and Neggers (2002) investigated how
action intentions influence visual selection processes in a
Fig. 1 Intentional weighting in visual processing. Selection of a
visual event is a function of two factors: the bottom-up saliency of
particular features of the event (coded on dimension-specific saliency
maps) and the top-down weighting of feature dimensions (operation-
alized here by determining the output gain of information coded on
saliency maps; see Wykowska et al., 2009). Bottom-up saliency and
top-down weighting interact to determine the impact of a feature
value coded on a given dimension on further processing
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visual search task, in which subjects either grasped or
pointed at a target. Targets varied in color and orientation.
The authors measured saccadic eye movements, since
saccadic eye movements precede goal-directed aiming
movements, whether one grasps or points to a target, which
allows measuring effects on action planning but not action
execution. Saccades toward orientation-defined targets
were more accurate in the grasping than in the pointing
condition, while no effect of manual action was found for
color-defined target objects. Since object orientation is
relevant for grasping while color is not, the authors suggest
that planning a particular motor action modulates the visual
processing of that stimulus. It thus seems that action
intentions can modify the tuning of neural channels rep-
resenting specific stimulus features. This fits with the idea
that intentions can assign more weight to a dimension that
is relevant for performing that action—an issue we will
elaborate in the following section.
Intentional weighting in action planning
Since action events and perceptual events rely on a com-
mon coding system, it follows that dimensional weighting
should not only apply to perceived events but also to action
events as well (Hommel, 2004; Hommel et al., 2001a).
Furthermore, since TEC does not distinguish between
feature codes for perception and feature codes for action,
making a particular dimension relevant for perceptual
discriminations should automatically induce task relevance
of the same dimension in action discriminations (cf.
Hommel, 2005). Indeed, converging evidence suggests that
planning an action primes perceptual dimensions related to
that action, that is, dimensions that provide information for
discriminating between action alternatives and/or for
specifying parameters of the action.
Traditionally, action planning has been investigated
separately from perceptual processes, as it was assumed
that perception and action planning are modular processes
that are separated in time, function, and mechanisms.
However, increasing evidence suggests that action plan-
ning is affected by perceptual processes and, more
importantly for the present discussion, perceptual processes
are systematically affected by action planning (e.g.,
Craighero et al., 1999; Hamilton, Joyce, Flanagan, Frith, &
Wolpert, 2007; Mu¨sseler & Hommel, 1997a; Wohlschla¨-
ger, 2000; for an overview, see Schu¨tz-Bosbach & Prinz,
2007).
Research that has looked into the question of how action
planning affects perception has initially focused on the
feature level, that is, on whether particular actions facilitate
or impair the perception of particular action-related fea-
tures. For instance, it has been shown that an object-
grasping action can be initiated more quickly if it is sig-
naled by a go signal that has the same shape as the object to
be grasped (Craighero et al., 1999). More direct evidence
for the sharing of feature codes between perception and
action was provided by Mu¨sseler and Hommel (1997a) and
Hommel and Mu¨sseler (2006) (see also Milliken & Lup-
ia´n˜ez, 2007; Oriet, Stevanovski, & Jolicoeur, 2007), who
observed that planning an action with particular spatial
features tends to prevent the planning individual from
perceiving the same feature in other, action-independent
visual events (for an overview, see Hommel, 2004). This
suggests that planning an action involves the activation of
codes referring to the features of the action, which facili-
tates the detection of action-related information (as in
Craighero et al., 1999), as well as the binding of these
codes into a coherent action plan, which impairs the cre-
ation of other bindings in perception (Mu¨sseler & Hommel,
1997b) or action planning (Stoet & Hommel, 1999) to the
degree that they feature-overlap.
More recent research has provided evidence that per-
ception and action interact not only at the feature level but
also at the level of feature dimensions, which speaks more
directly to our present discussion. For instance, in the study
of Fagioli, Hommel, and Schubotz (2007), participants
were preparing a grasping or pointing action before
searching for a shape- or location-defined visual target. It
turned out that preparing for a grasping action facilitated
the search for shape targets, whereas preparing for a
pointing action facilitated the search for location targets.
This suggests that preparing for an action induces a
stronger weighting of feature dimensions that provide
action-relevant information, such as shape features for
grasping and location features for pointing action (Hom-
mel, 2010). A follow-up study of Fagioli, Ferlazzo, and
Hommel (2007) showed that this effect does not require
active planning but can also be produced by priming the
action representation through videos showing the action.
This suggests that action representations contain informa-
tion about the feature dimensions that provide action-rel-
evant information and that this information automatically
primes action-related perceptual dimensions whenever the
action representation is activated. Interestingly, people
seem to make use of this association between action rep-
resentations and related feature codes even in what seems
like purely perceptual tasks. For instance, Schubotz and
von Cramon (2001, 2002, 2003) reported that monitoring a
series of visual events for a feature-defined oddball induces
activation in action-specific area of the premotor cortex. In
particular, attending to shape targets active areas involved
in grasping actions, while attending to location targets
activates areas involved in pointing.
Further converging evidence for the impact of action
planning on target detection comes from Wykowska and
Psychological Research (2013) 77:249–259 253
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colleagues. In the study of Wykowska, Schubo¨, and
Hommel (2009), subjects prepared for either a grasping
movement or a pointing movement but were not to execute
the movement until a visual search detection task had been
performed. While being prepared for the grasping or
pointing movement subjects performed a visual search
detection task in which a target circle had to be detected by
its luminance or by its size. After completing the detection
task, subjects were to execute the prepared movement. It
turned out that preparing for a grasping action facilitated
the search for shape targets, whereas preparing for a
pointing action facilitated the search for luminance targets.
These findings suggest a more general effect of action
planning on selection processes, showing that even early
perceptual processes in visual search can be influenced by
an action accompanying it. Moreover, the findings rein-
force the idea that preparing for an action primes an entire
dimension, thereby enhancing all features defined on that
dimension. To summarize, increasing evidence suggests
that preparing for a particular type of action involves a
readjustment of weights in such a way that action-related
perceptual dimensions will receive more weight—as indi-
cated in the scenario shown in Fig. 2.
Intentional weighting and task switching
We have now seen that the intentional-weighting mecha-
nism may help us understand the way perception and action
planning interact. In particular, considering the logic and
operation characteristics of weighting mechanisms it is
easy to see that and why action intentions and action
planning affect visual search and bias the processing of
feature-overlapping stimuli. However, as we will show in
the following section, intentional weighting also affects
other layers of behavioral control. As we have pointed out
in the introduction, intentional-weighting mechanisms are
assumed to operate off-line and they are likely to be slow
and to produce relatively ‘‘sticky’’ control configurations.
How sticky these configurations can be is obvious from
studies on task switching.
Task-switching paradigms are investigating the limits of
behavioral flexibility. They commonly require participants
to switch between two or more tasks with the main interest
being whether performance on switch trials is worse than
on trials in which the task is repeated. Numerous studies
provided strong evidence that switching between tasks
indeed produces performance costs, that is, performance is
worse on switch trials than on repeat trials (for an over-
view, see Monsell, 2003; Kiesel et al., 2010). Most inter-
estingly for our purposes, switching costs are obtained even
if participants have full pre-knowledge about which task to
perform and ample time to prepare—the so-called residual
switching costs (e.g., Meiran, 1996). Numerous factors
have been suggested to contribute to residual switching
costs (see Kiesel et al., 2010) and one of them is presum-
ably related to intentional weighting.
As Allport, Styles, and Hsieh (1994) have considered, at
least part of the performance deficit after a task switch may
be due to proactive interference, that is, to the fact that the
previous task representation is still sufficiently activated to
compete with the current task representation. To investi-
gate the impact of proactive interference, Meiran, Chorev,
and Sapir (2000) have manipulated the interval between the
previous response and the point in time the cue is
informing the participant about the upcoming task. The
longer this interval was the smaller were the residual task-
switching costs (note, however, that this observation does
not seem to generalize across all display formats: Proctor,
Koch, Vu, & Yamaguchi, 2008). Meiran et al. (2000)
considered the possibility that such a decrease reflects the
gradual deactivation of the previous task representation,
and they suggested that switching between tasks might
require the adjustment of weights assigned to particular
stimulus and response features. In their experimental task,
participants were to press one of two diagonally arranged
buttons (say, a top-left and a bottom-right button) in
response to either the horizontal or vertical location of
visual stimuli that randomly appeared in one corner of a
2 9 2 grid. As suggested by Meiran et al. (2000), preparing
for the horizontal task might require a stronger weighting
of stimulus and response features related to the horizontal
location dimension, whereas the vertical task requires a
Fig. 2 Intentional weighting in action planning. Preparing for an
action increases the weight of feature dimensions (i.e., increases the
output gain of feature values coded on that dimension) that provide
information that is suited to specify open parameters of the action,
such as size in the case of a grasping action or location or luminance
in the case of a pointing action (see Hommel, 2010). As in the case of
visual attention, top-down weighting interacts with bottom-up
saliency to determine the impact of a feature value from a particular
dimension on further processing
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readjustment of these weightings so to increase the weight
of the vertical features. This possibility would fit with the
observation that residual switching costs are strongly
reduced, if not eliminated, if the response sets of the two
tasks do not overlap (Kieffaber, Kruschke, Walker, &
Hetrick, 2012; Yeung & Monsell, 2003). Hence, there are
reasons to assume that intentional weighting, and the after-
effects of previous weightings, contribute to performance
costs under task-switch conditions.
More direct evidence for a contribution of weighting
mechanisms would be provided by demonstrating not only
non-specific performance decrements, when weightings
have to be modified, but also specific biases of control
processes induced by previous weightings. We sought for
this kind of evidence by employing a two-dimensional
Simon task (Simon & Rudell, 1967). The Simon task is a
choice reaction time task in which the location of the
stimulus is irrelevant while the location of the response is
not, like when participants press a left versus right key in
response to the color of stimuli that randomly appear on the
left or right of a display. The common finding is that
responses are performed faster and more accurately when
response location and stimulus location correspond, despite
the fact that no relationship between the two exists—the
Simon effect (Simon & Rudell, 1967; see reviews by Lu &
Proctor, 1995; Hommel, 2011).
Memelink and Hommel (2005, 2006) turned the basic
setup into a two-dimensional Simon task. Like in the task
used by Meiran (1996), the response buttons were diago-
nally arranged (e.g., top-left and bottom-right) and the
stimuli appeared at the corners of an imaginary 2 9 2 grid.
Importantly, this setup allows for the separate computation
of two types of Simon effects: a horizontal effect (com-
paring performance when the horizontal location of stim-
ulus and response did or did not match) and a vertical effect
(comparing performance when the vertical location of
stimulus and response did or did not match). Participants
were to switch between this two-dimensional Simon task
and another, logically unrelated task that required paying
attention to either the horizontal or the vertical location of
visual stimuli. As expected, switching from the horizontal
version of the attention task increased the size of the hor-
izontal Simon effect, whereas switching from the vertical
version of the attention task increased the size of the ver-
tical Simon effect. This provides direct evidence that pre-
paring for the attention task involved the adjustment of
weighting for horizontal and vertical stimulus features and
that these weightings carried over to the Simon task, where
they apparently affected both stimulus and response cod-
ing. Hence, attending to the horizontal stimulus dimension
in the attention task seems to have turned the top-left key
press in the Simon task into a ‘‘left’’ rather than a ‘‘top’’
event, while attending to the vertical stimulus dimension in
the attention task apparently did the opposite.
Another study that suggests that feature weightings can
carry over from one task to another was reported by Mei-
ran, Hommel, Bibi, and Lev (2002). They investigated
task-switching performance in a task version that measured
whether participants felt sufficiently prepared to carry out a
new task (Dixon, 1981; Dixon & Just 1986). Participants
were presented with cues that identified the upcoming task
and could take as much time as they wanted to prepare.
Whenever they felt ready, they indicated this by pressing a
‘‘ready’’ button. It was expected that longer preparation
time would indicate better preparation, which should result
in a negative correlation between preparation time and the
reaction time in the upcoming task. In contrast, however,
this correlation was positive, suggesting that longer prep-
aration was associated with worse performance. The
authors considered that participants might not have been
able to consciously access the degree of their preparation,
which rendered the readiness response and the subsequent
task-specific response more or less unrelated. However,
people are likely to vary in concentration over time, which
might have induced the positive correlation: if a participant
would happen to be highly focused on the task, this would
be likely to speed up both the readiness response and the
task-specific response a few seconds later, but if a partic-
ipant would happen to be distracted during the readiness
interval, he or she would also be likely to be distracted
during the actual task trial. In other words, the values of
global cognitive-control parameters might vary spontane-
ously over time, so that temporarily close responses would
be equally affected. This interpretation was supported by a
Fig. 3 Intentional weighting in task switching. The task set defines
task-relevant feature dimensions for perceptual and action-related
decision-making. Depending on the task, this may affect feature
weighting in a top-down fashion, very much like an action control
(see Fig. 2), or in a bottom-up fashion, as with task cues that are
correlated with the task relevance of a particular feature dimensions.
The weightings interact with bottom-up saliency to determine the
impact of feature values coded on a particular feature dimension to
determine their impact on further processing
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second experiment, in which task readiness was directly
manipulated. Two preparedness conditions were intro-
duced: a high-readiness condition, in which the instruction
was to indicate readiness when completely ready, and a
low-readiness condition, in which participants were to
indicate readiness as quickly as possible. Results were as in
the first experiment, that is, long reaction times in the
readiness task yielded long reaction times in the task-
switching task. This provides strong support for an off-line
operating intentional-weighting mechanism: if response
speed receives more weight in one task, this setting is
likely to spill over to other, temporarily close tasks and
responses. Figure 3 provides an illustration of this scenario.
Intentional weighting of action effects
Up to now we have looked into the impact of intentional
weighting on perceptual features and on action features, as
well as interactions between them. According to TEC, the
cognitive representations of action features derive from the
perceptual effects the respective actions are known to pro-
duce. Pressing a left or right key creates perceptual events
that, among other things, have the feature of occurring on
the left or right side of some reference point, or from each
other. Accordingly, the cognitive representations of left and
right keypresses should include codes referring to the left-
ness and rightness of these events, which renders the actions
‘‘left’’ and ‘‘right’’ in cognitive terms. As we have seen,
emphasizing particular spatial dimensions in one task can
spill over to other tasks and modulate the spatial charac-
teristics of the cognitive representation of actions (e.g., by
emphasizing or de-emphasizing their leftness and right-
ness). An interesting, counter-intuitive feature of TEC is
that it does not distinguish between action features that
seem to be more intrinsic, such as the leftness or rightness of
a particular finger movement, and more extrinsic, over-
learned consequences of an action, such as the tone that is
produced by pressing a particular piano key. Accordingly, it
should be possible to affect and bias the cognitive repre-
sentation of actions not only through the intentional
weighting of intrinsic action effects, such as the spatial
location or endpoint of a movement, but also through the
weighting of extrinsic, acquired action effects.
A study that speaks of the possibility to modify the
cognitive representation of action by drawing attention to
particular extrinsic action effects is that of Hommel (1993).
He had participants carry out an auditory Simon task, in
which they pressed left and right keys in response of the
high or low pitch of a tone that was randomly presented
through a left or right loudspeaker. Pressing a key produced
a light flash on the opposite side, so that pressing the left key
had a visual effect on the right side and pressing the right
key had an effect on the left side. When participants were
instructed to ‘‘press the left/right key’’ in response to the
tone, a standard Simon effect was obtained: performance
was better if the tone appeared on the same side where the
correct response key was located. This suggests that the
actions were spatially coded with respect to the location of
the key or the finger operating it. However, when partici-
pants were instructed to ‘‘flash the right/left light’’ in
response to the tone, the Simon effect was reversed: now
performance was better if the tone appeared on the side
where the visual action effect was expected. This suggests
that the actions were spatially coded with respect to the
visual action effect, whose cognitive code was in this case
apparently weighted more strongly than the cognitive code
of the location of the response key or the finger.
The resulting scenario is shown in Fig. 4, where the
weighting of different response dimensions is influenced by
intention. That is, focus on the response key gives the
spatial features of the keypress response dimension more
weight while focus on the visual effect gives more weight
to the more remote action effect.
Conclusion
We have seen that several cognitive phenomena can be
explained in terms of an intentional-weighting mechanism.
As the available research suggests, the intentional-
weighting principle is applicable to, and provides a better
understanding of selection processes in (visual) perception,
action, executive control, and the dynamic interplay
between perception and action. As such, the principle
Fig. 4 Intentional weighting in action-effect coding. Effectors, and
action effects are spatially coded and the relative weights these codes
receive depend on the instruction in the task representation. In the
example, the location of the hand is presented to matter more than the
location of some experimental light effect of the action (see Hommel,
1993). If hand location and light locations differ, instruction
determines the stimulus–response compatibility
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seems to grasp the very essence of the contextual flexibility
and adaptivity of human behavior.
The intentional-weighting mechanism seems to work in
such a way that weights are assigned to whole dimensions/
domains such as color or location, rather than to specific
feature values such as ‘red’ or ‘up’. Activation (or putting
more weight on a domain) results in a greater impact of
feature values coded on this domain or dimension in sub-
sequent cognitive operations. Changing these weightings
and transferring them from one domain to another seems to
be a rather slow process, which invites cross-talk effects
and task-switching costs.
Given the broad generality of the intentional-weighting
mechanism and its applicability to the various cognitive
phenomena, it is interesting to ask whether and to which
degree these phenomena are actually different. From the
perspective of the Theory of Event Coding (Hommel et al.,
2001a), selecting a stimulus is not any different from
selecting a response: both are considered events of the same
sort that are cognitively represented alike, so that selecting a
stimulus in selecting a response differs with respect to the
consequences of the selection but not regarding the selection
operation. Accordingly, it may very well be that the top-
down contributions to such selection operations are of the
same kind as well. Recent work of Rangelov, Mu¨ller, and
Zehetleitner (2012) indicates that the logic underlying the
proposed weighting mechanism can also be extended to task-
set-dependent processes that intervene between stimulus and
response. Although Rangelov et al. (2012) argue for multiple
weighting systems, the operational characteristics of their
weighting mechanism is very similar to the one described
here. A similar recent development that is, however, more
devoted to the interaction between perception and action is
the Multidimensional Vector Model of Stimulus–Response
Compatibility suggested by Yamaguchi and Proctor (2012).
The model allows for representing differential weightings of
stimulus dimensions as a function of response properties—
which the authors demonstrate to account for a number of
stimulus–response compatibility phenomena and which
perfectly fits the theoretical approach we suggest. In any
case, the suggested principle of intentional weighting is not
only rather general but also sufficiently simple to further
reduce the loans of intelligence taken when explaining
intentional human behavior.
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